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Abstract: This paper argues that higher property taxes and uncertainty 
about post-easement tax levels create a disincentive for landowners to 
participate in federal conservation easement programs such as the Wetland 
Reserve Program. This hypothesis is supported by exploratory econometric 
analyses using state level data from the 1992 Wetlands Reserve Pilot 
Program. If this conjecture is supported by additional research, then such 
disincentives should be accounted for in the bid acceptance process of 
future Federal conservation easement programs, or other policies should be 
developed to reduce the effects of property tax differentials and post­
easement tax uncertainty on enrollment decisions. 
-

Property Taxation and Participation in Federal Easement Programs: Evidence from
 
the 1992 Pilot Wetlands Reserve Program
 
One aspect of the relationship between property taxes and conservation 
easements has long been recognized by state and local authorities: conservation 
easements reduce the taxable land base and thus shift the local tax burden to other 
properties. With the recent Congressional recommitment to using voluntary federal 
easement programs as a national resource conservation tool (as demonstrated in the 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act ), attention must also be 
given to the converse relationship that differences in property taxes across states and 
localities might affect enrollment rates. If differential property tax rates are found to 
affect landowners' willingness to participate in programs like the Wetlands Reserve 
and Wildlife Incentive Programs, then enrollments could diverge from the 
Congressional intent that these programs "maximize the environmental benefits for 
each dollar expended" [Sec. 331, H.R. 2854] 
With supporting evidence from state level enrollment in the 1992 Wetlands 
Reserve Pilot Program (WRPP) conducted in nine states, this paper argues that higher 
property taxes and uncertainty about post-easement tax levels may create a 
disincentive for landowners to participate in agricultural land retirement programs. To 
the extent that such a relationship exists, then the divergent agricultural land tax rates 
•depicted in Figure 1 may cause deviations from optimal geographical participation in 
federal easement programs in which enrollment efforts are targeted towards regions 
Figure 1 
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and sites that generate high environmental benefits. Notably, regions such as the 
Northeast and the Upper Midwest that tend to have higher absolute and relative tax 
rates would be expected to experience relatively low participation rates, in spite of 
evidence that these areas derive the greatest benefits from resource conservation and 
environmental protection [e.g. Ribaudo]. While the notion of taxation affecting 
choice is standard fare in economics, this factor has yet to be incorporated into 
analyses that simulate participation in wetlands reserve programs [e.g. Heimlich; Parks 
and Kramer; Parks, Kramer and Heimlich]. 
Particular attention will be given to factors affecting land use decisions in New 
York. This state had the lowest bid submission levels in the WRPP, raising genuine 
concern among national and state conservation agencies and organizations [American 
Farmland Trust, 1993a]. New York also had the highest property tax rates of the 
states that participated in the 1992 WRPP. 
Background 
The Wetlands Reserve Program was established in the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (the 1990 Farm Bill). The intent of the program 
is to use a voluntary permanent easement approach to restore and protect up to one 
million acres of converted and farmed wetlands. In 1992, the United States 
Department of Agriculture initiated a nine-state pilot program to enroll 50,000 acres in 
California, Louisiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North 
Carolina, and Wisconsin. The 'final regulations documenting this program were 
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published by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) on June 
4, 1992. A two week window for expressing interest by submitting a non-binding 
"Intention to bid" was established for late June, and the deadline for submitting actual 
bids and restoration plans was September 24, 1992. In January 1993, ASCS made 
offers on 46,888 acres on 265 farms, at a cost of about $46 million. 
As demonstrated in Table 1, intentions to bid, actual bid submissions, and 
acceptance rates in the WRPP varied widely across states. Defining eligibility in 
Table 1: Absolute and Relative Participation Rates in 1992 WRP Pilot By State in ,000 Acres 
-

State Hydric 
Croplanda 
(HC) 
Wetland 
Acres Intended 
for Biddingb 
(% of HC) 
Wetland 
Acres 
Submittedb 
(% of HC) 
Wetland 
Acres 
Acceptedb 
(%of HC) 
Cost Per 
Acreb 
($) 
California 3,268.2 
6,714.7 
2,441.2 
9,545.2 
2,225.1 
4,123.8 
415.9 
1,175.0 
1,127.5 
78.5 
(2.40) 
45.1 
(0.67) 
119.3 
(4.89) 
33.3 
(0.34) 
115.7 
(5.20) 
28.7 
(0.69) 
3.0 
(0.72) 
25.6 
(2.18) 
12.9 
(1.14) 
34.3 
(1.05) 
27.9 
(0.42) 
69.9 
(2.86) 
13.1 
(0.14) 
65.0 
(2.92) 
14.6 
(0.35) 
0.5 
(0.12) 
15.3 
(1.30) 
8.5 
(0.76) 
6.0 
(0.18) 
5.1 
(0.08) 
14.1 
(0.57) 
0.7 
(0.01 ) 
14.9 
(0.67) 
2.7 
(0.06) 
0.1 
(0.02) 
4.7 
(0.40) 
1.6 
(0.15) 
1,787 
1,168 
702 
1,082 
723 
1,032 
2,934 
780 
782 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
New York 
North 
Carolina 
Wisconsin 
a Source: 1987 NRI as adjusted by SCS (Colacicco), b USDA, ASCS 1993. 
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terms of total acres of hydric cropland [Colacicco], Louisiana and Mississippi had the 
highest acre submitted/acre eligible ratio, and New York and Minnesota had the lowest 
acre submitted/acre eligible ratio. Whereas the decision to submit bids for such 
programs is likely attributed to a number of diverse factors such as constraints 
imposed by the timing of the sign up period, the agricultural systems and land returns 
in the region, and topographical features of agricultural land and wetlands [American 
Farmland Trust, 1993b], it is also likely to be affected by the financial ramifications of 
enrolling in the programs. 
One of the financial factors that should enter into the decision process is local 
property taxation, which impacts the price of participating in programs. Ceteris 
paribus, states or localities that have high property taxes on post-easement land would 
be expected to have lower participation rates because higher taxation indicates a 
greater subsidization to the program. The rationale for this statement proceeds from 
the concept of fair market capitalization, which suggests that the value of a property to 
the average or typical manager in "prior" agricultural uses will be given by 
CV: . =Capitalized Value = Gross Returns - Costs - Taxes (1) 
pnar i 
where i is the relevant discount rate, and all components of the numerator on the right 
hand side are annual values. In calculating the capitalized value, it is important to 
realize that property taxes are accounted for in the formula. 
• 
In deciding whether to bid in an easement program, a landowner must compare 
this opportunity cost with other benefits and costs associated With enrollment. 
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Benefits might include explicit items such as easement price and possible post-
easement returns, as well as "intangible" motives such as altruism and stewardship. 
Explicit costs of enrollment would include any costs associated with maintenance and 
restoration, and post-easement taxes associated with the new classification of land. 
Other "intangible" costs, such as the loss of sovereignty of land might also be 
important individual decision processes. In all, the decision to participate in an 
easement program could be characterized by the following comparison of returns and 
costs associated with participation in the program: 
Easement Price + Restoration Payments+ Annual Post-Ea~ement Returns + Intangible Gains ~>­

I
 
Post-Easement Tsxes+ Other AnnualCosts CVprtcr+ Restoration Costs + Intangible Losses +	 i 
(2) 
To the extent that the gains as exhibited on the left-hand side of the equation exceed 
the losses de'fined on the right-hand side, the appropriate private decision is to 
participate. Alternatively, the decision to participate can be framed as a preference 
relationship of net intangible factors with the financial loss or gain associated with 
enrollment: 
Net Intangible Factors ~ >- (Capitalized Value - Easement Price) 
+ (1 -y) *Restoration Costs 
_	 (Post-EasementTsxes+Other Annual Costs-Post-Easement Retum 
i 
(3) 
-
In the above equation, net intangible factors refers to the individual weighing of non­
financial benefits less costs. On the right-hand side, the first term reflects the 
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difference in the easement price and the capitalized value, which is technically 
bounded at zero from above by the requirement that "The total easement payment 
may not exceed the average fair market value of the same type of agricultural land in 
the county or parish." [Iowa State University Extension]1; the second term reflects the 
amount of wetlands restoration cost sharing contributed by ASeS, which has an upper 
bound of y =75 percent; and the third term characterizes the post-easement 
capitalized value. Based on discussions with wetlands owners in New York, this latter 
term tends to be positive; Le. taxes and, to a lesser extent, other maintenance costs 
exceed any financial remuneration. As such, the "fair market value of the land 
encumbered by the easement" is perceived to be less than zero [So 2830, p. 933]. 
To the extent that the bid price equals capitalized value, the participation 
decision will simplify to a comparison of net intangible factors with the owners" share 
of the restoration costs and perception of the post-easement capitalization of land. 
Since post -easement taxes are a component of the post-easement capitalization of 
land, increases in these taxes will reduce the likelihood of participation. Under the 
assumption that restoration costs2 , post-easement uses, and the distribution of 
1 This restriction imposes another possible disincentive to participate in regions, 
such as along urban fringes, where the development value greatly exceeds the 
agricultural use value. It should also be noted that the assumption that easement 
prices are bounded by capitalized values, removes any positive effect on participation 
associated with property tax levels prior to the easement. Such an argument has 
•been used to justify why farmers enter conservation programs that provide property 
tax incentives [e.g. Smith]. 
Heimlich (1994) suggests that wetlands restoration costs vary widely, but will 
largely be a function of drainage installed rather than inherent regional differences. 
2 
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individual landowner willingness to subsidize a wetlands program are relatively 
constant across regions, the likelihood of participation across regions will simplify to a 
function of post-easement taxes. 
Uncertainty Regarding Post-Easement Taxation 
To date, there is little evidence documenting how individual states and counties will 
value and tax wetlands conversions. In general, there is not a standard formula for 
assessing the value of wetlands, and valuation will proceed on a case-by-case basis 
varying by tax unit and the land-use and management practices on the converted land. 
An exception to this generalization is found in areas that have adopted uniform use 
value assessments for agriculture. For instance, in New York, some degree of 
unifonnity is imposed by use value taxation requirements in agricultural districts. 
Under this system a wetland would be classified as a mineral soil group 10, with a 
value per acre of $30. Farm woodland, which may adjoin a wetland, would be valued 
at $223 per acre. It is important to note that, in spite of this taxation policy, only a 
portion -- about one-third -- of New York agricultural land is enrolled in agricultural 
districts. Thus this exception is likely to have limited consequences on statewide 
enrollment. 
Other factors may act to increase the uncertainty regarding post easement 
taxes. Continuing with the New York example, the uncertainty with having the 
-

wetlands parcel revalued is compounded by the fact that assessors may offset any 
reductions in use value associated with wetlands by updating,. and perhaps adjusting 
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• 
wetlands parcel revalued is compounded by the fact that assessors may offset any 
reductions in use value associated with wetlands by updating,. and perhaps adjusting 
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upward, the value of the assessment on the remaining property [New York Department 
of Environmental Conservation]. Finally, even if wetland values remained constant 
across tax units, differential rates of taxation based on equalization and mill rates 
would lead to widely divergent taxes on similar parcels -- thus creating differential 
incentives to participate within states and counties. 
In lieu of precise knowledge about the level of post-easement assessments, it is 
assumed here that wetlands taxes will vary across states in proportion to the current 
level of agricultural land taxaticm. In other words, in making their enrollment decisions, 
landowners believe that their taxes will be a fixed proportion (d) of their current 
assessed value, regardless of region: regions with higher land tax rates will be 
assumed to have higher wetlands tax rates. As indicated in Figure 1a, the average 
agricultural taxation levels do vary substantially across states in absolute terms. 
Figure 1b demonstrates that there is also wide variation in tax rates relative to land 
values. In Michigan for instance, the average tax per hundred dollars of full market 
value (t) in 1991 was $3.21, as compared to $0.09 in Delaware during the same 
period. In capitalized terms, the respective values for Michigan and Delaware 
translate to $64.2 and $1.80 per hundred dollars of value (i = .05). Thus, based on 
the fixed proportion assumption, d, a wide variation in post-easement taxes is 
expected across states. 
-
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Do Differential Property Taxes Affect Participation?: Evidence from State Level 
Participation in the 1992 Pilot WRP 
The data presented in Table 1 and Figure 2 suggests that there is indeed a 
relationship between acres accepted into the 1992 Pilot WRP and the average tax per 
acre on agricultural real estate. Using acreage and tax data provided in Table 1 and 
Figure 1, simple linear regressions relating the participation (as a proportion of hydric 
cropland) to property tax levels and total hydric acres further supports this hypothesis. 
As demonstrated in the first four rows of Table 2, 53 to 61 percent of the variation in 
landowners' decisions to register an intention to bid and to actually submit a bid by 
state is explained by these very simple models. 
Figure 2: Tax Per Acre and Wetlands Acres Bids Submitted by State, 
Wetlands Reserve Pilot Project 1992 
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Table 2" Property Value Taxation and Participation in Federal Easement Programs: OLS Results for 
the 1992 Wetlands Reserve Pilot ProgramS 
Dependent Variable R2 Constant Tax/$100 
Value of 
Farmlandb 
Tax/Acre 
of 
Farmlandb 
Total 
Hydric 
Crop 
Acresc 
[,000,000] 
Avg. 
State 
Cost! 
Acreb 
[$,000] 
Acres IntendedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
Acres IntendedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
Acres SubmittedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
0.53 
0.58 
0.58 
0.027** 
(0.009) 
0.050"­
(0.014) 
0.028­
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.004)" 
-0.011 ­
(0.004) 
-0.0018 ­
(0.0007) 
-0.0020 
(0.0010) 
-0.0036 " 
(0.0017) 
-0.0021" 
(0.0010) 
Acres SubmittedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
Acres AcceptedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
Acres Accepted/ Total 
Hydric Acres 
Acres AcceptedfTotal 
Hydric Acres 
0.61 
0.60 
0.69 
0.75 
0.029"­
(0.008) 
0.0062 "­
(0.018) 
0.0067 
.., 
(0.0016) 
0.0075'­
(0.0016) 
-0.0022 ­
(0.0009) 
-0.0016 
(0.0008) 
-0.0011** 
(0.0004) 
-0.00027'­
(0.00009) 
-0.0021" 
(0.0010) 
-0.00058' 
(0.00027) 
-0.00052"" 
(0.00056) 
-0.00053 
.. 
(0.00019) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
• * ..* ..** refer to significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Numbers in 0 are standard errors.
 
b Source: DaBraal, 1994.
 
< Source: 1987 NRI as adjusted by SCS
 
More important, the estimated coefficients are significant and of the expected sign. 
The negative coefficient on absolute and relative levels of taxation correspond with the 
conceptual framework above. Similarly, the negative coefficient on hydric acres is 
consistent with the hypothesis that there are institutional limitations on the amount of 
land that can be submitted and processed by overburdened field offices in a short sign 
up period. • 
Similar regression results were obtained for the ratio of accepted acres to total 
eligible acres as the dependent variable. However, actual enrollment levels will 
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depend not only on landowners' decisions to bid, but also on the acceptance selection 
process, of which the bid price is instrumental in the ranking formula that divided a 
"wetland score" by the easement and restoration costs [Thompson]. Other things 
constant, the higher the bid, the lower the likelihood of acceptance. This result is born 
out somewhat by the negative, but not significant (with 5 degrees of freedom), 
coefficient on the average cost of parcels accepted. It is interesting to note that, in 
spite of the inclusion of this variable, the coefficients on the tax per $100 value and 
acreage variables remain significant. A separate regression with total taxes 
representing the tax variable were not evaluated due to the high collinearity with the 
cost variable. 
While the graphical and statistical analyses relationships are suggestive, they 
are somewhat speculative. Correlation does not imply causation, and there may be 
many other factors not accounted for in this simple analysis. For example, standing 
crops in Iowa made site work relatively difficult in that state while the relatively high 
cost of surveying required to delineate wetlands was acutely felt in California 
[American Farmland Trust, 1993b]. Characteristics of wetlands themselves may also 
affect participation rates in the sense that wetlands in some states such as Louisiana 
might be of a more contiguous nature than wetlands in New York or Minnesota. 
Nevertheless, the current analysis does support the hypothesis that property taxes 
have a negative effect on participation decisions. 
• 
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Discussion 
The policy implications of these results are unclear, in part because of the exploratory 
!' 
nature of the analysis. Obviously this analysis suffers from limited data, or what 
Goldberger has termed linear micronumerosity". Moreover, the assumptions used to 
create this analysis may be inappropriate: d may not be constant across states and 
the average state values used may not characterize the actual underlying distributions. 
Even supposing that the results herein are indicative of a relationship, it is still 
uncertain whether the degree of deviation from a program that would maximize net 
social benefits is large enough to warrant policy intervention. If, for example, the 
program objectives are to maximize enrollment at least cost regardless of regional 
distribution, then differential participation levels associated with taxation may only be of 
minor concern. 
Even with these cautions, the regression results presented here are 
suggestive. From a policy perspective, the implication is that future policy design of 
federal easement programs should acknowledge that different property tax policies 
across states may influence participation levels. At the federal level, minimal regional 
enrollment levels might be established in order to assure interregional equity and to 
maximize environmental benefits. However, as Heimlich has suggested, this will 
have a substantial impact on per acre enrollment costs. A second, equally costly, 
federal alternative might be to explicitly account for post-easement taxation in 
• 
evaluating and ranking bids. Finally, the federal agencies and the states might work 
together to establish more a priori certain levels of post-enrollment land values and 
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taxation levels. Reacting to both the differential enrollment levels as well as the local 
consequences of enrollment noted in the introduction, individual states might consider 
cost sharing property taxes to reduce enrollment uncertainty and to aid fiscally 
burdened localities. 
This analysis also raises a challenge to future research in land use decision 
making and participation in easement programs. Rather than simply deducing an 
economic criteria for participation as has been done in various papers, efforts should 
be undertaken to better understanding actual factors that lead to participation 
decisions. Much policy relevant research is warranted in order to answer basic 
questions such as, What are actual post-easement tax rates? Is there uncertainty 
about ex-post taxation levels?, and, Does uncertainty about post-easement taxation 
enter into decision making? 
" 
• 
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